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1 INTRODUCTION  
Modern flood risk management not only relies on 
flood defenses, but also considers measures to re-
duce the vulnerability (Hall & Solomatine 2008). In-
creased policy focus on vulnerability, as one of the 
components of flood risk, is triggered by recent dis-
asters in for example New Orleans in 2005 and Ja-
pan in 2011, both unexpected events that exceeded 
the protection standards. Despite these events and 
the fact that risks primarily increase due to popula-
tion growth and economic development in flood-
prone areas, many countries organize flood risk 
management around flood defenses with a protection 
standard. 
 
Flood risk or expected annual damage, quantified by 
the combined probabilities and consequences of all 
possible flood events in a region, is an effective de-
cision criterion to compare different types of meas-
ures, from strengthening embankments to land use 
planning. However, the use of a single risk estimate 
as decision criterion has also been criticized for a 
number of reasons:  
1. It  may  not  meet  the  decision  needs  of  all  
stakeholders (Downton et al. 2005); 
2. It assumes risk neutrality, while the public is 
generally risk averse (Merz et al. 2009); 
3. Risk is uncertain, since many assumptions are 
needed to calculate risk, especially for sys-
tems with an extremely high protection 
standard (as in the Netherlands); 
4. It hides information about the potential con-
sequences of events that exceed the protec-
tion standards.  
 
The main concern with using risk analysis in deci-
sion-support is how to deal with uncertainty. Down-
ton  et  al.  (2005)  argue  that  practitioners  should  
communicate better about uncertainties in estimates 
and how they are handled in developing strategic al-
ternatives, whereas others focus on developing quan-
titative uncertainty analysis methods in support of 
flood risk management (Hall & Solomatine 2008). 
The presence of uncertainty may be a reason to con-
sider additional decision criteria besides the single-
value flood risk estimate, for example the severity, 
duration  and  controllability  of  the  risk  (Stirling  
Enhancing flood risk system robustness in practice 
M.J.P. Mens 
Deltares, Delft, the Netherlands & Twente University, Enschede, the Netherlands 
F. Klijn 
Deltares, Delft, the Netherlands 
R. Schielen 
Twente University, Enschede, the Netherlands 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Decisions about flood risk management are usually based on the reduction in flood risk com-
pared to the implementation costs of the strategy. It is common practice to express flood risk (the combination 
of flood probabilities and potential flood damages) into a single number. The downside of this approach is 
that explicit information about how the system responds to the whole range of possible discharges is lacking. 
This type of information is relevant when a robust system is desired. We consider robust (fluvial) flood risk 
systems to have the ability to remain functioning under a range of river discharges. To understand system ro-
bustness, it is thus useful to analyze how the flood impact varies over a range of possible events. We applied a 
method to quantify the robustness of flood risk systems on a fluvial flood risk system in the Netherlands: the 
IJssel River, a branch of the Rhine River, and its flood-prone area. We compared four alternative system con-
figurations  of  the  IJssel  River  Valley,  and  analyzed  their  robustness,  applying  the  following  criteria:  resis-
tance threshold, response severity, proportionality and recovery threshold. The robustness analysis provides 
us with clues about how to enhance a flood risk system’s robustness. We found that a system with unbreach-
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the most proportional damage increase with increasing discharge, and the least uncertainty about where and 
when floods will occur. This shows that a robustness perspective helps to develop strategies that reduce the 
flood risks without increasing the consequences of beyond-design floods. 
 
1998). In addition, some authors propose taking into 
account worst-case scenarios (Merz et al. 2010) or 
start so-called ‘possibilistic thinking’ instead of 
‘probabilistic thinking’ (Clark 2005). Thus, in addi-
tion to the traditional comparison of flood risk and 
costs, it is advocated to analyse ‘what if’ design 
conditions are exceeded.  
   
In literature on socio-ecological systems, the pro-
posed way to deal with uncertainties is  to aim for a 
robust or resilient system, instead of trying to control 
external disturbances. Among other things, control 
means that the variability of the system is reduced to 
make its behaviour better predictable: floods hardly 
happen. However, the downside of too much control 
is that unanticipated events may cause surprise and 
crisis (Holling 1996): when a flood does happen it 
will be a disaster. The idea of steering on system 
persistence (thereby allowing disturbances) instead 
of system stability was first introduced by Holling 
(1973) for ecosystem management, and later ex-
tended to the management of socio-ecological sys-
tems (Carpenter et al. 2001, Walker & Salt 2006, 
www.resalliance.org). This type of management is 
called ‘resilience’. In the field of flood risk man-
agement, however, the term resilience is associated 
with the ability to recover from the response to a dis-
turbance (De Bruijn 2005), which is a narrower in-
terpretation than that of the ecological and socio-
ecological literature. To avoid confusion, we use the 
term  system  robustness  for  the  ability  to  remain  
functioning under a range of possible disturbance 
magnitudes (see also Mens et al. 2011).  
 
In this paper, we analyse robustness of a socio-
economic system to river flood waves, by providing 
insight  into  the  system response  to  a  range  of  river  
flood waves, including the extreme ones. From such 
an analysis, not only the level of protection but also 
the potential consequences of all possible discharge 
waves, and the balance between them, will become 
clear. 
 
This ‘robustness perspective’ fits well in the recent 
policy developments on flood risk management in 
the Netherlands. In 2009, the Dutch government in-
troduced what is referred to as a multi-layered ap-
proach to sustainable flood risk management, which 
states that three layers are required to manage flood 
risk in the long term: 1) flood defenses to protect 
against flooding, 2) spatial planning to limit the 
flood consequences, and 3) well-organized emer-
gency management (National Government 2009). 
However, this multi-layered approach does not yet 
have any official status. 
The idea of using system robustness as decision cri-
terion  in  addition  to  damage  risk,  fatality  risk  and  
costs, was already tried out in De Bruijn et al. (2008) 
and Klijn et al. (2012), but only in a qualitative 
manner. In this paper, we compare alternative sys-
tem configurations for the IJssel River Valley (a 
branch of the Rhine River) in the Netherlands, based 
on quantified robustness criteria. We apply the 
method as introduced in Mens et al. (2011) and ad-
justed in Mens & Klijn (in prep.). The following cri-
teria together provide an indication of system ro-
bustness (see Figure 1): 
x Resistance threshold, or the smallest river dis-
charge that will cause substantial economic 
damage; 
x Response severity, or the flood damage in ab-
solute terms; 
x Response proportionality, or the sensitivity of 
the response to changes in discharge; 
x Recovery threshold, or the discharge that will 
cause unmanageable flood disasters. 
 
In addition, the uncertainty about the resistance 
threshold and the response severity should be indi-
cated; the larger the uncertainty about these aspects, 
the lower the system robustness. The fourth crite-
rion, recovery threshold, points at some critical level 
of damage from which recovery will be very diffi-
cult.  Quantification  of  the  discharge  at  which  this  
critical threshold will be exceeded (the point of no 
recovery) requires insight into the flood damage 
relative to some maximum damage value or total- 
loss value. Analysing this is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretic response curve of a flood risk system 
(adapted from Mens et al. 2011) 
2  IJSSEL FLOOD RISK SYSTEM AND 
ALTERNATIVES 
We consider a flood risk system as the combination 
of physical and socio-economic characteristics of a 
region exposed to floods.  In this case,  we study the 
IJssel River and its flood-prone area: the IJssel Val-
ley. The flood-prone area consists of 6 dike-ring ar-
eas (see figure 2). Each dike-ring area is protected 
from flooding by a closed ring of flood defenses and 
adjacent high grounds, which are designed to with-
stand river flood waves that occur on average once 
in 1250 years.  
 
In view of climate change, the Netherlands govern-
ment has started a national ‘Delta Programme’ to 
develop a long-term strategy for flood and drought 
risk management (Delta Programme 2011a). One of 
the programme’s focal areas is the Rhine River 
delta, including the IJssel Valley. For the Rhine 
River, the design discharge (i.e., corresponding to a 
one in 1250-year flood wave) is expected to increase 
from 16000 m3/s to 18000 m3/s in the coming 50-
100 years. Potential strategies include embankment 
heightening, giving more room to the river (to make 
sure the design water levels will not change and con-
sequently the embankments do not need to be 
raised), unbreachable embankments, and combining 
embankments with spatial planning regulation (fol-
lowing the ‘multilayered safety approach’) (Delta 
Programme 2011b). 
 
The future discharge of the IJssel River is uncertain, 
because of uncertain climate change and because the 
distribution  of  water  over  the  three  Rhine  River  
branches is uncertain. Other relevant uncertainties 
are the flood wave shape (narrow or wide), the 
strength of the embankments and the location of 
embankment breaches. These sources of uncertainty 
influence the probability and consequences of flood-
ing. Therefore, it is relevant to evaluate proposed 
strategies on how the adapted system will  deal with 
a range of discharges, instead of optimizing the strat-
egy for just one design discharge. 
 
We analysed several alternative system configura-
tions, to explore what enhances the system robust-
ness to flood waves. A configuration is the combina-
tion of river hydraulics, embankment location and 
strength, and land use. The reference system is as 
close as possible to the real situation of 2015, except 
for the land use. A land use map of the year 2015 
was not available; instead, we used one of the year 
2000. Each dike-ring area has an assumed flood 
probability of 1/1250 per year. We compared the fol-
lowing alternative configurations with the reference 
system: 
1. CE Conventional Embankments: embank-
ments are raised with a ǻh (location-
dependent) that corresponds to a change in 
discharge from T=1250 to T=5000; 
2. RR Room for the River: the floodplains are 
lowered such that the water level at the cur-
rent design discharge is reached at a higher 
discharge. The ǻQ is about 300 m3/s, which  
corresponds to the change in discharge in 
CE; 
3. UE1 Unbreachable Embankments, version 
1: all embankments are strengthened (not 
raised) such that they become unbreachable. 
Water may, hence, flow over the flood de-
fense and still cause flood damage; 
4. UE2 Unbreachable Embankments, version 
2: like UE1, but embankments near cities are 
raised with 0.5 m. 
 
We assume that unbreachable embankments will 
never fail. In practice, it may be difficult or at least 
expensive to construct an embankment of which the 
probability of structural failure and thus breaching 
can be neglected. We use ‘neglected’, because a zero 
failure probability is geotechnically impossible. Cur-
rently, conventional embankments in the Nether-
lands have design criteria for each failure mecha-
nism. The failure probability due to overflow, at 
design conditions, should be less than 10% of the 
design standard. Other failure mechanisms than 
overflow are also allowed a maximum of 10% of the 
design exceedance probability. Unbreachable em-
bankments can be defined as embankments for 
which the design criteria are a factor 100 stricter, so 
that they also withstand conditions beyond design 
(see also De Bruijn et al. 2012). This means, for 
dike-ring areas with a design standard of 1/1250 per 
year, that the probability of failure of an embank-
ment due to overflow at design conditions is smaller 
than 1/1.250.000 per year. Therefore, we feel that 
the failure probability (in the meaning of breaching) 
may be neglected. However, further research is 
needed to explore the technical possibilities and 
costs of changing a conventional embankment into 
an unbreachable one. 
 
 
Figure 2. IJssel Valley study area with dike-ring areas and 
breach locations indicated 
3 QUANTIFICATION OF SYSTEM 
ROBUSTNESS 
3.1 Estimating economic damage 
Quantifying system robustness starts by constructing 
a so-called response curve: a relationship between 
the flood damage and the peak discharge (Mens et 
al. 2011), from which the robustness criteria can be 
derived. To estimate monetary flood damage, we 
used the 2-dimensional hydrodynamic flood simula-
tion model Delft-FLS (WL 2001) and the economic 
damage model DamageScanner (Klijn et al. 2007).  
 
Figure 3 shows the simulated flood waves. We chose 
three different peaks with each three different wave 
shapes. The wave IDs refer to the corresponding dis-
charge at Lobith, where the Rhine River enters the 
Netherlands, divided by 1000 m3/s. Thus, L16 corre-
sponds to a discharge of 16000 m3/s at Lobith. L14 
was chosen because there is a small probability that 
embankments fail at lower dicharges than the design 
conditions. For the alternative systems with un-
breachable embankments, two additional flood 
peaks were needed (L17 and L18). For these sys-
tems, no damage is expected for the lowest two 
flood waves (L14 and L16), since embankments are 
assumed not to breach and are modelled as high as 
the maximum water level L16 (design discharge). 
 
For the flood simulations, we selected eight repre-
sentative breach locations: one for each dike-ring 
area and two for the larger ones (numbers 52 and 53 
in Figure 2). The economic damage that occurs due 
to a dike breach at these locations is considered rep-
resentative for the area; this means that it should be 
comparable to the economic damage averaged over a 
large set of breach locations within one dike-ring 
area. The dikes are assumed to breach when the lo-
cal water level reaches its peak (for waves with 
Qpeak<2560 m3/s),  or  when  the  design  local  water  
level is exceeded (for waves with Qpeak>2560 m3/s). 
The design discharge is 2560 m3/s. We modelled the 
breach width as an exponential function of time; 
within 50 hours a breach width of 200 m is reached. 
The maximum depth, which is equal to embankment 
height minus land elevation, is reached in the first 
hour from the start of the breach. 
 
For the alternative system configurations, we needed 
additional assumptions. For conventional embank-
ments, the amount by which the embankments were 
heightened (ǻh) was derived from the frequency 
curve of local water levels. We combined the stage-
discharge relationship at each location (known from 
the model calculations) with the discharge-frequency 
curve of the IJssel River. The latter was derived 
from the discharge-frequency curve for the Rhine 
River  at  Lobith  (Thonus  et  al.  2003)  assuming  that  
16% of the discharge diverts to the IJssel River. The 
effect of this assumption is discussed in Mens & 
Klijn (in prep.). We substracted the water level at 
T=5000 years from the water level at T=1250 years, 
which resulted in a ǻh of 15-20 cm depending on the 
location.  
 
For alternative RR (‘room for the river’), the stage-
discharge relationship was adapted by 300 m3/s (see 
Figure 4), assuming that the effect will be equal for 
all discharges. In reality, the effect will be zero for 
discharges below a certain threshold, but since for 
these low discharges dike breaches are not expected, 
no damage was calculated. The assumption thus 
does not influence the results of this paper.  
 
For UE (‘unbreachable embankments’) we assumed 
embankment heights corresponding to the standard 
L16 flood wave, which corresponds to the design 
discharge. For UE2, the embankments near urban 
areas were raised with 0.5 m. The stage-discharge 
relationship remained unchanged.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Overview of simulated IJssel River flood waves 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Stage-discharge relationship at example location, for 
reference and for room for the river 
 
3.2 Response curves 
To obtain the response curve for the entire river val-
ley, the damages of all breach locations had to be 
combined. However, because of the uncertainty 
about embankment strength, it is unknown which 
embankment will breach first. Many combinations 
are possible, each with a different damage estimate. 
It is hydraulically impossible to have all eight 
breaches occurring within one flood wave, simply 
because there is not enough water to flood the entire 
system. Therefore,  we summed the damages of two 
to four breach locations in all possible combinations. 
Assuming that each combination has an equal prob-
ability of occurrence, and following a MonteCarlo 
approach, we derived box plots of the damage for 
each  flood  wave.  Figure  5  shows  the  result  for  the  
reference system. When one or more embankments 
fail, the damage is estimated between 0.3 and 31.4 
billion Euro (depending on wave height, wave shape 
and breach locations). It also becomes clear that a 
wider flood wave shape causes a significant increase 
of the damage. This means that the system is sensi-
tive for both the discharge peak and the discharge 
shape. Furthermore, the uncertainty about the breach 
location makes it very difficult to estimate what ex-
actly will happen during a particular flood wave.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Economic damage in the reference system, for each 
simulated flood wave (n=narrow, s=standard, w=wide), and 
uncertainty resulting from different breach combinations. Red 
line indicates the median, the box indicates the upper and lower 
quartiles, and the whiskers indicate the minimum and maxi-
mum value of the model output.  
 
To compare the response curves of alternative sys-
tem configurations (Figure 6), we assumed a stan-
dard wave shape and the median damage of all pos-
sible breach combinations. The vertical lines 
indicate the design discharge. Although it is uncer-
tain at what discharge a breach will occur, it is clear 
that the curve will suddenly increase from zero to 
significant damage when one or more embankments 
fail. Beyond that ‘critical’ discharge, the damage in-
creases with an increasing discharge peak.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Response curves of the alternative system configura-
tions, and the design discharges indicated with vertical dashed 
lines 
 
3.3 Robustness criteria 
The robustness criteria were derived from the re-
sponse curves and the boxplots for each alternative 
system configuration. Next, we explain the scores 
for each criterion. Table 1 provides an overview of 
robustness scores. 
 
To indicate the resistance threshold, i.e. the lowest 
discharge causing damage, we used the design dis-
charge. The reference system has a design discharge 
of 2560 m3/s (T=1250 years), just as UE1 and UE2. 
The configurations CE and RR have a higher design 
discharge of 2560 + 300 m3/s (T=5000 years). The 
design discharges are indicated with the vertical 
dashed lines in the response curves of Figure 6. We 
note that the actual resistance threshold is uncertain, 
since the embankment strength is uncertain; the low-
est discharge causing damage may well be lower or 
higher than the design discharge. This is not the case 
for UE1 and UE2. Because for these cases zero fail-
ure probability was assumed, the discharge causing 
damage only depends on the height of the embank-
ment instead of both height and strength. We con-
sider the height of the embankments well-known in 
the Netherlands, so the level of uncertainty about the 
resistance threshold is much lower for unbreachable 
embankments. 
 
The response severity is indicated by the median of 
the economic damage as a result of discharge wave 
L19s (the highest flood wave that was simulated, 
with a standard shape). The choice of L19 is under-
pinned as follows. The aim is to show the difference 
in absolute damage between system configurations 
as a result of an extreme discharge wave. Lower dis-
charges were only simulated for the unbreachable 
embankment alternatives (L17 and L18), or do not 
cause any damage in UE1 and UE2 (L14 and L16). 
The level of uncertainty about this value (due to 
breach combinations and wave shape) was scored 
separately, using the boxplots explained in section 
3.2. We used the minimum value (smallest damage 
resulting from the narrow wave shape) and the 
maximum value (highest damage resulting from the 
wide wave shape) of flood wave L19, given in per-
centage difference from the median of the standard 
shape. 
 
The robustness criterion ‘proportionality’, indicating 
the  sensitivity  of  the  damage  for  changes  in  dis-
charge, was scored by visually comparing the re-
sponse curves of Figure 6. We ranked them based on 
the damage at the resistance threshold and the steep-
ness of the curve. The alternative with the largest 
change in damage and the steepest curve receives a 
score of 1 (low proportionality); the alternative with 
the smallest change in damage and the flattest curve 
receives a score of 4 (high proportionality).  
 
The largest difference is found in the damage at the 
resistance threshold. When embankments fail at the 
resistance threshold, suddenly large damages occur 
in CE and RR. In UE1 and UE2 this damage is close 
to zero. Thus, CE and RR score 1 or 2, and UE1 and 
UE2  score  3  or  4.  The  response  curves  of  CE  and  
RR are equally steep, but the sudden increase in 
damage of CE is larger. Therefore, CE scores 1 and 
RR scores 2. The response curve of UE2 is clearly 
less steep than that of UE1, therefore UE2 receives 
the highest score 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Overview of robustness scores of all system configurations. Colours indicate for each criterion the lowest score (red) and 
the highest score (green) in terms of robustness.  
Robustness criterion Dimension Conventional 
dikes 
Room for the 
river 
Unbreachable Embankments 
    CE RR UE1 UE2 
Resistance threshold m3/s 2860 2860 2560 2560
level of uncertainty - high high low low
Response severity Beuro 11.2 9.3 7,1 3,7
level of uncertainty % -95 - 180 -95 - 190 -50 - 95 -70 - 130
Proportionality rank nr. 1 2 3 4
 
 
4 DISCUSSION OF ROBUSTNESS SCORES 
The aim of this paper was to compare alternative 
system configurations on their robustness to flood 
waves. Here we discuss the robustness scores for 
each system configuration. 
 
The systems with unbreachable embankments (UE1 
and UE2) score best on all robustness criteria except 
the resistance threshold. The flood damage for dis-
charges that exceed the resistance threshold is lower 
than that of all other configurations, and it increases 
proportional to the discharge increase. This is be-
cause water flows over the embankment without 
breaching the embankment, resulting in significantly 
less floodwater. Although the resistance threshold is 
slightly higher than that of the other configurations, 
there is little uncertainty about it. Differently stated: 
a lower resistance threshold is acceptable, because 
the uncertainty is small. The uncertainty about the 
response is smaller as well. This is because the un-
certainty about where embankments will breach is 
eliminated, since the probability of breaching is neg-
ligible. A reduction of uncertainty implies that it can 
be better predicted when and where floods are to be  
expected. The remaining uncertainty is due to the 
shape of the discharge wave. 
 
The system with room for the river (RR) also has a 
lower flood damage for all discharges above the re-
sistance threshold (compared to CE), but the reduc-
tion is less than that of unbreachable embankments. 
Moreover, a flood may still cause an unmanageable 
situation.  
 
The system with conventionally-raised embank-
ments (CE) increases the resistance threshold (com-
pared to the reference), but consequently reduces the 
proportionality. This means that it appears to be 
safer, because higher discharges are needed to cause 
flooding, but once the embankments fail the flood 
will be unmanageable to a larger degree than in the 
reference and in RR. In terms of uncertainty and 
proportionality, CE scores comparable to RR. 
 
The system with unbreachable embankments type 2 
(higher embankments near urban areas) further re-
duces the flood damage and increases the propor-
tionality. This shows that if it is possible to build 
unbreachable embankments, it is beneficial to priori-
tize locations based on potential damage and casual-
ties.  
5 CONCLUSION 
A risk approach a key to modern flood risk man-
agement, but for deciding about the most desirable 
system configuration in view of uncertain dis-
charges, a robustness perspective may be of added 
value. We analysed the flood consequences of the 
IJssel Valley in terms of economic damage for four 
alternative system configurations. Based on the re-
sults, we conclude that the following characteristics 
enhance system robustness of the IJssel Valley: 
- Limited uncertainty about where, when and how 
embankments will fail. If a flood is better pre-
dictable, it is better manageable and as such it 
increases the system robustness. This can be 
achieved by building unbreachable embank-
ments, preferably differentiated in height. 
- Good balance between a high resistance thresh-
old and yet a relatively low flood damage. This 
can be achieved by ensuring a limited difference 
between design water levels and the elevation of 
the protected area. The case study showed that it 
is possible (e.g., by giving room to the river) to 
increase the design discharge without increasing 
the potential damage, whereas just raising dikes 
does increase the potential damage.  
 
Other characteristics that positively influence the ro-
bustness include (not studied in this paper):  
- Critical infrastructure (such as major roads, 
power supply, hospitals and food supply) in 
higher areas (Wardekker et al. 2010); 
- A controlled breach process, for example by 
structures that limit the breach growth; 
- Flood-proof buildings and infrastructure; 
- Compartments that limit the flood extent and 
thereby reduce the flood consequences (Klijn et 
al. 2009). 
 
Of all studied alternative configurations of the IJssel 
Valley, the one with unbreachable embankments 
(type 2) increases the robustness most. However, 
there are practical limitations to construct unbreach-
able embankments, such as costs and available 
space. The most effective locations could be selected 
based on casualty reduction relative to marginal 
costs (De Bruijn et al. 2012). 
 
We  feel  that  these  conclusions  apply  to  all  em-
banked river valleys with a natural relief, and with 
hydraulic system behaviour. Hydraulic system be-
haviour ensures that, when water flows over the em-
bankments at one location, water levels elsewhere 
will be lowered. Measures that reduce the water 
level (like giving room to the river) will be extra ef-
fective in areas where the stage-discharge relation is 
steep, thus where an increase in discharge causes a 
large increase in water level. This is regularly the 
case near large cities. Unbreachable embankments 
will have a limited effect on robustness in small pol-
der areas that will fill up very quickly, causing large 
water depths and thus casualties and damage.  
 
We conclude that a robustness perspective makes 
explicit what happens if protection standards are ex-
ceeded. It thus helps in developing strategies that re-
duce the flood risks without increasing the conse-
quences of beyond-design floods. 
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